We introduce a model of war and peace in which leaders believe that their adversaries might be crazy types that always behave aggressively, regardless of whether it is optimal to do so. In the model, two countries are involved in a dispute. The dispute can end in a peaceful settlement, or it can escalate to "limited war" or "total war." If it is common knowledge that the leaders of countries are strategically rational, then the only equilibrium outcome of the model is peace. If, on the other hand, a leader believes that there is some chance that his adversary is a crazy type, then even a strategically rational adversary may have an incentive to adopt a "madman strategy" in which he pretends to be crazy. This leads to limited war with positive probability, even when both leaders are actually strategically rational. We show that despite having two-sided incomplete information, our model has a generically unique equilibrium. Moreover, the model identifies two countervailing forces that drive equilibrium behavior: a reputation motive and a defense motive. When the prior probability that a leader is crazy decreases, the reputation motive promotes less aggressive behavior by that leader, while the defense motive promotes more aggressive behavior by her adversary. These two forces underly several comparative statics results. For example, we analyze the effect of increasing the prior probability that a leader is crazy, as well as the effect of changing the relative military strengths of the countries, on the equilibrium behavior of both leaders. Our analysis also characterizes conditions under which the madman strategy is profitable, as well as conditions under which it is not, thereby contributing to a debate in the literature about the effectiveness of the madman strategy.
"Come egliè cosa sapientissima simulare in tempo la pazzia."
["It is wise to sometimes pretend to be crazy."] -Niccolò Machiavelli in Discourses on Livy
Introduction
In the opening paragraph to his classic article, Fearon (1995) lists three explanations for the occurrence of wars:
"First, one can argue that people (and state leaders in particular) are sometimes or always irrational. They are subject to biases and pathologies that lead them to neglect the costs of war or to misunderstand how their actions will produce it. Second, one can argue that the leaders who order war enjoy its benefits but do not pay the costs, which are suffered by soldiers and citizens. Third, one can argue that even rational leaders who consider the risks and costs of war may end up fighting nonetheless." (pg. 379)
Fearon proceeds to focus his attention on the third perspective, which he calls the "rationalist explanation" of war. Under this perspective, war is an outcome of strategic actions taken by two rational (and unitary) states that have fully considered its costs, benefits and uncertainty. Indeed, with very few exceptions, it is the rationalist explanation that the formal literature on war addresses. 1 Moreover, despite the plausibility of Fearon's first two explanations, the bulk of this literature makes the idealized assumption that it is common knowledge that all leaders are rational and behave strategically. Yet, both historical and contemporary evidence suggests that this assumption is more an idealization of reality, rather than a reflection of it. 2 There is ample evidence that key decision-makers in the real world have, at various times, tried to build reputations for being crazy or to take advantage of existing concerns by their adversaries that they may be irrational. Consider, for example, White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman's (1978) recollection of president Richard Nixon explaining to him the "madman theory" at the height of the Vietnam War:
"I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry-and he has his hand on the nuclear button' and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." (pg. 122)
White House papers released in the early 2000's made it clear that the Nixon administration actually put this madman strategy to use. On October 10, 1969, Nixon ordered a secret operation called "Giant Lance" under which eighteen B-52 bombers loaded with nuclear weapons flew towards the Soviet Union to get the Soviets to think that he was possibly mad, and that he might be willing to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam (see, for example, Sagan and Suri 2003) .
In addition, there is also evidence that other leaders have used the madman strategy or that they were actually crazy. This evidence spans much of history, even going back to ancient times. For example, Kimball (2004) argues that the strategy was used by the Hittite King Mursli in antiquity, when demanding the release of a hostage. Much more recently, the New York Times reported that in late 2005, Gen. John Abizaid of the United States Central Command expressed concern "that Iran's new President Ahmedinejad seemed unbalanced, crazy even."
3 Given the use of the madman strategy in history, and the doubts that contemporary political and military leaders express about the sanity of their adversaries, the idealized assumption of common knowledge of rationality appears at odds with reality. This paper develops a model of war that relaxes the assumption of common (in fact, mutual) knowledge of strategic rationality. Our model builds on the existing crisis bargaining framework, but assumes that there exist types of both countries that have behavioral commitments to particular actions, including how much they are willing to concede in bargaining. In our model, these types are "crazy" in a particular way: whenever they are confronted with a choice between two actions, they always choose the more aggressive action, and at the time of bargaining they only make or accept offers that would give them an unreasonably large payoff. Consequently, one can view our model as bringing together Fearon's (1995) three explanations for war. It introduces crazy types that are "subject to biases and pathologies that lead them to neglect the costs of war," or "who enjoy its benefits but do not pay the costs" and, it explores the effect of these types on the behavior concessional action, and eventually has a strict incentive to pretend to be crazy. Then, the strategy of always pretending to be crazy becomes profitable as the desire to preserve the reputational content associated with aggressive behavior (reputation motive) is no longer a concern. On the other hand, when the prior probability with which the other country is crazy exceeds a certain threshold, the madman strategy may not be adopted at all as the defense motive can no longer compensate for the increase in the expected aggressiveness of the opponent. Therefore, whether or not the madman strategy works depends on prior beliefs about both countries, and on how each country is expected to respond to aggressions. In particular, even if a country has an incentive to occasionally pretend to be crazy, this may be only payoff neutral.
In the remainder of the introduction, we provide a simple illustration of the most salient features of our approach. Section 2 reviews the literature. We present the model in Section 3. In Section 4, we study the comparative statics of the model. Section 5 concludes.
An Illustration of our Approach
Consider the game tree depicted in Figure 1 . Countries A and B are engaged in a dispute. Country A moves first -the choice is between attacking country B and resolving the dispute peacefully. If country A attacks, then country B chooses between surrender and retaliate. If country B retaliates, then country A can either end the war with an armistice, or it can escalate the conflict by choosing total war. Since all actions are uniquely labeled, we can identify terminal nodes with the actions that lead to them. We assume that 1 < w < 3 so that country A's preference over outcomes is surrender A peace A armistice A total war, while country B's preference is peace B armistice B surrender B total war. Note also that the payoffs in Figure 1 are consistent with the idea that war is costly: with each aggressive action -attack and retaliate -one unit of total payoff is lost, and with total war an extra three units are lost. By backward induction, one can show that under complete information the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the model is peace.
However, suppose that country B believes that country A is a strategic type that plays according to sequential rationality only with probability p ∈ (0, 1); for our purposes, we assume that p is close to 1. With complementary probability 1 − p, country B believes that country A is a crazy type that always chooses attack and always chooses total war in the event that country B chooses to retaliate. For simplicity, assume that country A is certain (i.e., believes with probability 1) that country B is a strategic type that plays according to sequential rationality. Finally, suppose that these prior beliefs are common knowledge. It is easy to show that this game has a unique sequential equilibrium in which the strategic Sequential rationality requires the strategic type of country A to always choose armistice over total war when confronted with this decision. Let a denote the equilibrium probability with which country B believes that country A is the strategic type, conditional on country A choosing attack. If country A attacks, then country B's expected payoff from retaliating is aw while its payoff from surrendering is 1. Consequently, the equilibrium probability with which country B retaliates is 1 if a > 1/w and 0 if a < 1/w. Country B mixes between surrender and retaliate only if a = 1/w. Now, it is clear that there is no equilibrium in which the strategic type of country A chooses peace with probability 1. If there were such an equilibrium, then conditional on country A choosing to attack, country B would believe with certainty that country A is crazy, i.e. a = 0. But since the crazy type always chooses total war, country B would surrender for sure. Therefore, the strategic type of country A would want to deviate to attack. Similarly, there is no equilibrium in which the strategic type of country A attacks for sure. Otherwise, given that both types of country A attack, country B's posterior would be the same as its prior, i.e. a = p. Now, we assumed that p is close to 1; in particular we assume p > 1/w. But in this case, country B retaliates with probability 1, which in turn implies that the strategic type of country A would want to deviate to peace.
Equilibrium must then involve the strategic type of country A mixing between peace and attack, and thus it must be indifferent between these two actions. This indifference pins down the probability with which country B retaliates. It is easy to show that this probability is simply 1/w. Since country B mixes between retaliate and surrender, it must be indifferent between these actions, so a = 1/w. This then pins down the equilibrium probability with which the strategic type of country A chooses to attack. That probability is (1 − p)/[(w − 1)p] > 0. This concludes the characterization of the sequential equilibrium. Now, define the equilibrium probability of war to be the probability that the equilibrium outcome will be armistice or total war. This probability is
Therefore, the probability with which country A attacks is increasing in its prior probability of being the crazy type. Also, the probability with which country A attacks and the probability with which country B retaliates are both decreasing in w. Since w measures the split of total payoff after an armistice, we conclude that the probability of war is decreasing in the relative strength of country B. Equation (1) implies that the equilibrium probability of war goes to 0 as p goes to 1. Nevertheless, even a relatively small probability that country A is the crazy type can lead to war with significantly higher probability. For example, suppose that w = 1.1 so that country A is relatively stronger than country B, and there is a 1% prior chance that country A is the crazy type, i.e. p = 0.99. In this case, the equilibrium probability of war is slightly over 10%. This is because the probability with which the strategic type of country A attacks is slightly above 10% while country B retaliates with probability slightly larger than 90%. Therefore, even a small chance that country A is crazy may have an amplified effect on its equilibrium behavior. Note also that in this example, slightly over 90% of wars are fought between strategic types.
The example above highlights some of the salient features of our approach. However, several questions remain: What happens when both countries have positive prior probability of being crazy? What happens when these probabilities are not as small as we have assumed above? What happens when one country is able to make offers to the other country to avoid war or cease hostilities? In this case, what can one assume about the behavior of the crazy type at the negotiating table? Which incentives determine the probability with which strategic types participate in costly conflicts? The model that we build in this paper addresses all of these questions. It handles two-sided incomplete information with ease; its equilibrium predictions are almost always unique; it generalizes the comparative statics results above; and it identifies the incentives that lie behind these comparative statics.
Related Literature
Our paper builds upon the crisis bargaining literature, which goes back to the work of Powell (1987) , Banks (1990) and Fearon (1995) . The chief insight coming out of this literature is that war cannot be an equilibrium outcome when both parties are able to locate a Pareto superior negotiated settlement. On the other hand, our model shows that because of the presence of aggressive crazy types, bargaining cannot resolve conflict even between the strategic types when these types have incentives to pretend to be crazy types that are unreasonably demanding. In this way, our model is most closely related to crisis bargaining models with private information in which the parties involved have incentives to misrepresent their information, for example Fey and Ramsay (2010), Leventoglu and Tarar (2008) , Slantchev (2005) , and Schultz (1999) . However, the key difference between our work and this work is that these previous papers incorporate incomplete information by assuming that types can be either "tough" or "lenient" rather than "crazy" or "strategic." In particular, even the "tough" types are strategic, and will accept concessions that are larger than any payoff they can hope to achieve by rejecting. Besides being qualitatively different, our model facilitates a more tractable analysis and, in contrast to previous papers, yields unique equilibrium predictions, which enables us to deliver a number of comparative statics results relating the probability of war and the payoffs received by the strategic types with the prior probability of the crazy types.
Substantively, our paper contributes to the debate over the effectiveness of the "madman theory," as articulated by Richard Nixon in one of our motivating quotes above. Kaplan (1991) explains how scholars in the 1950s and 60s debated over the merits of the use of irrationality and unpredictability in nuclear policy. While some scholars, including Schelling (1963) , did not consider the madman strategy to be an effective strategy in the age of nuclear weapons, others, notably Kissinger (1969), argued in favor of the madman strategy (claiming that the Soviets were also using it) as well as the merits of limited war (which in our model can be thought of as a war ending with the action we label "armistice"). Indeed, Kissinger became an ardent supporter of the madman strategy while working for Nixon, and oversaw much of its use in Vietman. For example, Sherry (1995) argues that the Nixon administration's decision to indiscriminately bomb Cambodia was a manifestation of the madman theory, while Sagan and Suri (2003) recount the use of the madman strategy in Operation Giant Lance, which we mentioned in the introduction. Whether or not the madman strategy actually works has been up for debate, however. Kimball writes, for example, that "with or without nuclear threats, the madman theory has worked for some decision makers, leaders, statesmen, tyrants, aggressors, and conquerors during the long course of history, but it has not always worked, and it did not work for Nixon and Kissinger during the Vietman War."
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Although the debate over the effectiveness of the madman strategy is yet unresolved, it appears that the strategy may be frequently used in modern politics. For example, Simon suggests that Kim Jong Un might be using the madman strategy, 6 and Lake (2011) writes that the George W. Bush administration thought of Saddam Hussein as "uniquely evil," suggesting that they might have viewed him as a potential madman. Given this, Lake (2011) argues for a theory of war that accounts for the possibility of cognitive biases and irrationality. As a step in this direction, our model introduces the possibility of a "crazy type" in the standard crisis bargaining model, and contributes to the debate over the effectiveness of the madman strategy. In particular, we characterize conditions under which the madman strategy yields a higher expected payoff than any other strategy (making it an equilibrium strategy) and conditions under which it doesn't. In doing this, we exploit the uniqueness of equilibrium predictions to derive comparative static results with respect to the aggressiveness of the countries and their relative military strength. Our paper is also closely related to an incisive paper by Patty and Weber (2006) . These authors argue that war cannot arise under the assumption of common knowledge of strategic rationality, but they do not model what happens when this assumption is relaxed. We, on the other hand, explicitly relax the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, and as a result we are able to characterize the effect of crazy (or "irrational," in the language of Patty and Weber) types on the equilibrium behavior of strategic types.
Ours is not the first paper on international security to study the effect of incorporating behavioral types into an otherwise rational framework. In an early paper, Alt, Calvert and Humes (1988) studied deterrence by a hegemonic power against a series of short run challengers in which the hegemon could possibly be a dominant strategy type as in Kreps and Wilson (1982) . These papers, and others in the reputation literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine 1989) , show that the opportunity to build a reputation is payoff-improving to the player who takes the opportunity to build it. In contrast to these papers, in our model strategic agents pool with the behavioral type, even though this is (in expectation) payoff-neutral for them. In this way, our paper is most closely related to the work of Abreu and Gul (2000) on reputational bargaining that shows that a slight possibility of irrationality for either side has a pooling effect that produces inefficient delays in bargaining.
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Two compelling foundations for the crazy type that appears in our model emerge from the work of Weisiger (2013) in international relations theory, and Bénabou and Tirole (2009) in behavioral economics. Weisiger (2013) argues that certain leaders possess a dispositional inability to commit to peace. Benabou and Tirole (2009) study belief distortions created by pride, dignity and wishful thinking about future outcomes, especially as they relate to intransigence in bargaining.
Model
Consider the game tree depicted in Figure 2 . Countries A and B are engaged in a dispute. Country A begins by deciding between peace and attack. In the case of peace, the countries receive payoffs (z A , z B ). If country A attacks, then country B makes an offer
, where x A is the payoff it is offering to country A and x B ≡ 1 − x A is the payoff that it is proposing for itself. Country A can either accept the offer or escalate the conflict by rejecting it. If it rejects, then country B either signs an armistice that leads to payoffs (y A , y B ), or it chooses total war, which results in payoffs (0, 0). We assume that war is costly for both sides. Assumption 1. War is costly:
Under Assumption 1, it is easy to see that with complete information, the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium whose only outcome is peace. However, instead of assuming complete information, suppose that at the beginning of the game, country B believes that country A is strategically rational only with probability a 0 ∈ (0, 1); with complementary probability 1 − a 0 , country B believes that country A is a crazy type that always attacks, and accepts an offer x A if and only if x A ≥ r A for some r A < 1. Similarly, assume that at the beginning of the game country A believes that country B is strategically rational only with probability b 0 ∈ (0, 1); with complementary probability 1 − b 0 , country A believes that country B is a crazy type that always makes the offer s A ∈ X for some Figure 2 : The Game Tree s A > 0, and always chooses total war. 8 We call this game G(a 0 , b 0 ), and we make the following assumptions on r A and s A .
Assumption 2. Greedy crazy types:
Assumption 2(i) states that the crazy type of country A seeks a payoff greater than the peaceful payoff z A . It also states that this type is not too demanding: the agreement that it seeks is better for country B than the outcome under an armistice. This means that country B has the opportunity to reach a settlement that is better for it than a war that ends in armistice, even when country A is crazy.
9 Assumption 2(ii) states that the crazy type of country B makes an offer that is worse for country A than the outcome under armistice, and worse than giving country B the payoff it would have received under peace. Combining Assumptions 1 and 2 yields:
It is useful to point out that our assumptions give strategic types the opportunity to prevent either the start or the escalation of a costly war at each node (country A can choose peace or accept the offer of country B, while country B can make the concessional offer r A or choose armistice). We make this modelling choice primarily because we are interested in understanding how the existence of crazy types may lead to costly conflicts between strategic types, even though there are agreements that would be Pareto superior for the strategic types. In other words, we are analyzing a model in which the assumptions are stacked against producing war through the introduction of crazy types. 10 Nevertheless, we will show that costly wars may take place. A behavioral strategy profile for the game
, where α is the probability with which the strategic type of country A chooses to attack; α x : X → [0, 1] is a mapping where α x (x A ) denotes the probability with which the strategic type of country A rejects the offer x A ; β ∈ ∆(X) is a probability measure over the set of feasible offers made by the strategic type of country B; and β T W : X → [0, 1] is a mapping where β T W (x A ) is the probability with which the strategic type of country B chooses total war following the rejection of offer x A by country A. If the strategic types of the two countries play the behavioral strategy profile (α, α x ), (β, β T W ) then country B's updated belief that country A is strategic, conditional on an attack, is
Country A's updated belief that country B is strategic, conditional on receiving an offer (x A , x B ), is given by the function
We denote country B's belief that country A is strategic at the node where it chooses between total war and armistice by a x . Although we can characterize a x using Bayes rule, its value will not matter at any information set. This is because Assumption 1(ii) implies that in any perfect equilibrium of the game, the strategic type of country B will choose armistice.
Before stating our first proposition, we define the following thresholds:
It is easy to verify from Assumptions 1 and 2 that 1 > a > a > 0 and 1 > b > b > 0. These thresholds are depicted in Figure 3 , which divides the parameter space P = (0, 1) 2 into five regions, labeled (i) through (v). We now characterize the equilibria of the game G(a 0 , b 0 ) in these five regions, except on the boundaries. 
(ii) If b 0 > b and a 0 < a, then in every equilibrium, we have α = 1, α x is given by (*) above, β(r A ) = 1 and β(x A ) = 0 for all
, and β(x A ) = 0 for all
(iv) If b 0 > b and a > a 0 > a, then in every equilibrium we have α = 1,
Proof. See Appendix A.
We summarize the main features of equilibrium as follows. If the prior probability that country B is strategic is very low, b 0 < b, then the strategic type of country A will not attack to avoid having to bargain with what is likely to be the crazy type of country B (case (i)). However, the strategic type of country A may attack when b 0 > b. If country A is likely to be crazy, a 0 < a, while country B is believed to be strategic with probability b 0 > b, then the strategic type of country A will attack for sure, and the strategic type of country B will try to settle the dispute early by making the concessional offer r A . This offer will be accepted by both the strategic and crazy types of country A (case (ii)). If country A is likely to be strategic, a 0 > a, and country B is moderately likely to be strategic, b > b 0 > b, then the strategic type of country A attacks with probability α ∈ (0, 1). If it attacks, then the strategic type of country B mixes between the concessional offer r A , which would be accepted for sure, and the greedy offer s A , that the crazy type of country B would make. Therefore, the strategic type of country B sometimes pretends to be crazy (case (iii)). This is also what happens when country B is very likely to be strategic, b 0 > b, and country A is moderately likely to be strategic, a > a 0 > a, except that in this case the strategic type of country A attacks for sure (case (iv)). Finally, when both countries are very likely to be strategic, a 0 > a and b 0 > b, then country A mixes between attacking and taking the peaceful outcome; and following an attack, country B mixes between the concessional, intermediate and greedy offers, r A , y A and s A (case (v)). An important feature of Proposition 1 is that its predictions are unique. As we mentioned in Section 2, our model differs from other crisis bargaining models with incomplete information in that it does not lead to multiplicity of equilibrium predictions. The reason for this is as follows. The behavior of the strategic type of each country is determined by two countervailing forces: (i) the incentive to build a reputation for being crazy by mimicking the crazy type (which deters the opponent from behaving aggressively), and (ii) the incentive to deter the opponent from too often pretending to be crazy. For a wide range of values of prior beliefs, a 0 and b 0 , equilibrium requires that these two forces exactly offset each other. This can happen only if the strategic type is indifferent between its actions. In turn, this indifference requires that the strategic type assigns a particular probability to its opponent being the crazy type. This probability pins down equilibrium behavior and delivers uniqueness. Put differently, uniqueness stems from the fact that, in equilibrium, the strategic type has to mimic the crazy type with a particular probability, which results in an equilibrium level of reputation that leaves the strategic type of the opponent indifferent between its equilibrium actions.
Furthermore, although country B has infinitely many possible offers, in equilibrium it only makes one of three offers: a low (greedy) offer s A that corresponds to what the crazy type of country B would ask for, an intermediate offer y A that is equal to what country B would offer in the complete information game, and a high (concessional) offer r A that even the crazy type of country A would accept. Other offers are neither helpful in building a reputation for being crazy, nor optimal against one of the two types of country A. They reveal that country B is the strategic type, but conditional on country A knowing this, country B could do better.
Also notice that in region (v) the strategic type of country B makes offers y A and r A with positive probability even though both these offers are accepted with probability 1 by the strategic type of country A and r A > y A . To understand this feature of equilibrium, notice that these offers yield different payoffs in the event that country B is facing the crazy type of country A. Indeed, the crazy type accepts r A and rejects y A with certainty; consequently, country B's payoff from making these offers are 1 − r A and y B respectively, with 1 − r A > y B by Assumption 2(i). Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium updated belief a 1 will be such that the strategic type of country B is indifferent between offering r A (and receiving 1 − r A with certainty) and offering y A (and receiving 1 − y A with probability a 1 and y B with probability 1 − a 1 ).
Finally, Proposition 1 contains the result that uncertainty concerning a country's type leads to conflict with positive probability, and that conflict is hard to settle. To see this, note that α, the probability with which the strategic type of country A decides to attack, is positive in all regions except (i), and the equilibrium behavior further implies that armistice arises with positive probability in regions (iv) and (v). Thus, not only the strategic type of country A does initiate conflicts, but also the strategic type of country B may fail to make offers that would settle them without creating further inefficiency.
We end this section by noting that, as in the illustrative example of Section 1.1, the majority of wars may be fought between strategic types. To see this, define the equilibrium probability of war to be the probability with which the game play reaches the node in which country B must choose between armistice or total war. Then, note that the fraction of wars fought between two strategic types is simply 
where α, α x (s A ) and β(s A ) are the equilibrium values of these choice variables given in Proposition 1. This follows because the unconditional probability that the game play reaches the node in which country B chooses between armistice and total war is the expression in the denominator, while the same probability, conditional on both types of countries being strategic, is the expression in the numerator. Then, assume that the payoff parameters of the model are given by: so that the payoff that a strategic type of country B can get from conflict (y B ) is lower than the payoff that country A can get (y A ). Furthermore, let a 0 = b 0 = 0.99 so that countries are believed to be strategic with 99% certainty. In this case, the fraction of wars fought among strategic types ends up being approximately 75% of all wars. Thus, even though the fraction of crazy types in the population is relatively small, uncertainty may lead to excessive aggression by the strategic types, to the point where most wars are fought among strategic types.
Comparative Statics
In this section we report some of the comparative statics of the model with respect to parameters that have particular interpretations. In Section 4.1, we report the comparative statics of equilibrium behavior. In Section 4.2, we report the comparative statics of the ex ante expected payoffs of the strategic types.
Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Behavior
Below, we report the comparative statics of equilibrium behavior with respect to a 0 and b 0 , which measure the prevalence of crazy types; with respect to r A and 1 − s A which we interpret as measuring the "aggressiveness" of the crazy types during the bargaining phase of the game; and, finally, with respect to the the payoff split from armistice (y A , y B ), which we interpret as reflecting the relative military strength of the two countries during war.
Prevalence of Crazy Types. Proposition 2 below reports the comparative statics of equilibrium behavior (specifically, the choice variables α, α x (x A ) and β(x A )) with respect to a 0 and b 0 . (The comparative statics of β T W (x A ) are trivial since it is always equal to 0.) Its proof follows from the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1 and its visual representation is provided in Figure 3 . For ease of reading, we state the result referring to the regions (i) to (v) depicted in the figure, rather than repeating the thresholds that define these regions.
Proposition 2. The comparative statics with respect to a 0 and b 0 are as follows:
(1) α is continuous and weakly decreasing in a 0 for all b 0 . Furthermore, it is strictly decreasing in a 0 only in regions (iii) and (v).
(2) β(r A ) is constant (and equal to 1) in regions (i) and (ii), strictly decreasing in b 0 in region (iii) and (v) and strictly increasing in b 0 in regions (iv). Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1.
According to Proposition 2, the probability with which the strategic type of country A attacks is strictly decreasing in regions (iii) and (v) and constant everywhere else. The intuition for this is similar to the one we provided in the example of Section 1.1. Consider, for instance, region (v), and recall that Proposition 1 states that country B mixes between three offers: the concessional offer r A that the crazy type of country A accepts, the intermediate offer y A , and the greedy offer s A . This is possible only if country B is indifferent between these offers. Now, suppose that a 0 increases while α remains constant. In this case, after an attack, country B believes that country A is irrational with lower probability. This in turn makes the concessional offer less attractive. So, to keep country B indifferent between the three offers, the equilibrium value of α must in fact adjust down in order to maintain a fixed posterior probability of country A being the crazy type. We call this the reputation motive. Intuitively, the reputation motive leads the strategic type of country A to compensate changes in the exogenous probability of attacking, a 0 , with changes in the endogenous probability of attacking, α, in order to maintain the level of reputation, a 1 , constant. The same intuition holds in region (iii). In the remaining regions, the incentives for the strategic country A to mimic the crazy type are either totally absent (region (i)) or overwhelmingly strong (regions (ii) and (iv)), leading to the result that α is constantly equal to 0 and 1 in these respective cases.
The relationship between β(·) and b 0 is more interesting. Here, there are two competing forces. On the one hand, as we increase b 0 , the strategic type of country B must decrease the probability with which it mimics the crazy type, which is a consequence of a reputation motive analogous to the one we described in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, country B has to "protect" itself from the possibility of aggressive behavior by country A. This can be done in two ways: exogenously, by relying on its reputation for being a crazy type, 1 − b 0 , or endogenously, by decreasing the probability β(r A ) of the concessional offer. In order to prevent the strategic type of country A from attacking too often, the strategic type of country B has to substitute an increase in the exogenous parameter b 0 with a decrease in the endogenous probability β(r A ). We call this the defense motive. Obviously, this motive is stronger if there is a high probability that country A is playing strategically (a 0 high). As a result of these two opposing forces, β(r A ) is increasing in b 0 in region (iv), where the reputation motive prevails, and is decreasing in b 0 in regions (iii) and (v), where the defense motive prevails. Furthermore, the probability mass lost by offer r A in country B's equilibrium strategy as a consequence of the defense motive is reallocated either to the greedy offer s A or to the intermediate offer y A that would arise in the complete information game. In particular, s A receives more of this mass in region (iii) when the prior probability of country B being crazy is high, while y A receives more of the mass in region (v), where this probability is relatively low and it is harder for the strategic type of country B to mimic the crazy type.
Finally, consider the comparative statics of the probability with which country A rejects B's offer, α x (·). Since the strategic type of country A will always accept offers r A and y A , the only relevant comparative static here is the one of α x (s A ) with respect to a 0 . This probability is constantly equal to 0 in regions (i) to (iii), increasing in a 0 in region (iv), and equal to a positive constant in region (v). This happens because at this late node in the game, the reputation motive disappears, but the defense motive is still in play: country A has to substitute its exogenous reputation with endogenous choices, to avoid being exploited. It does this by increasing the probability of rejecting the greedy offer s A .
To sum up, on the one hand the reputation motive pushes for a decrease in the aggressiveness of strategic types as a result of a decrease in their prior probability of being crazy; on the other hand because of the defense motive the strategic types of both countries will react to a decrease in the exogenous probability of being crazy with an increase in the endogenous probability of mimicking the crazy types.
Aggressiveness of Crazy Types. The defense motive is also at play when we study how the countries' probabilities of concession vary as we increase the "aggressiveness" of the crazy type of the opponent. We measure the aggressiveness of country A's crazy type by r A and the aggressiveness of country B's crazy type by 1 − s A . (Here, we are measuring aggressiveness by the minimum share of surplus that the crazy type seeks during the bargaining part of the game.) As we increase r A , the probability β(r A ) with which the strategic type of country B makes the concessional offer decreases. Similarly, as we decrease s A , the probability α x (s A ) with which the strategic type of country A rejects the greedy offer s A goes up. The intuition for these results is that in both of these cases, the defense motive pushes strategic types to react to an exogenous increase in the aggressiveness of the opponent by lowering the probability with which they submit to aggressive behavior. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium:
(1) The probability β(r A ) with which country B makes the concessional offer is weakly decreasing in r A .
(2) The probability α x (s A ) with which country A rejects the greedy offer of country B is weakly decreasing in s A .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Military Strength. We now consider the comparative statics of equilibrium behavior with respect to changes in y A while holding the sum y A + y B constant. The reason that we are interested in these comparative statics is because we interpret the payoff split (y A , y B ) as a measure of the relative "military strength" of the two countries. The stronger a country is, the larger the share of payoffs it can expect to receive following a war that ends in armistice. To state the result of this section, we make the following assumption. Our objective is to study the effect of a change from payoff profile h to h on the equilibrium behavior characterized in Proposition 1. Let α, α x and β denote the equilibrium quantities evaluated at payoff profile h, and let α , α x and β denote the same quantities evaluated at payoff profile h . Similarly, a, a, b and b are the thresholds in (5) evaluated at h, while a , a , b and b are the thresholds evaluated at h . It is straightforward to verify the following (in)equalities:
One can verify thatã ∈ (a, a ). Given this, the following proposition characterizes the comparative statics of the equilibrium behavior with respect to the payoff split (y A , y B ). 
Proof. See Appendix C.
The proof of the proposition in Appendix B utilizes the fact that a discrete change in y A keepingȳ fixed has two effects. First, it modifies the boundaries of four out of the five regions defined in Proposition 1. Second, it affects the equilibrium behavior of countries within each of the five new regions. The comparative statics of the equilibrium behavior must take into account the combination of these two effects since equilibrium strategies may differ across the boundaries of the five regions.
The result of Proposition 4 can be understood as follows. Part (1) of the proposition states the intuitive result that an increase in the relative military strength of country A makes it behave (weakly) more aggressively. In particular, the probability of an attack increases unless country A was attacking either with probability 1 or with probability 0; in the latter case, the reputation of country B for being crazy is so high that it discourages country A from initiating a conflict. Part (2) states that the probability of making the greedy offer is weakly decreasing in country A's relative military strength. The reason for this is that an increase in y A reduces country B's equilibrium expected payoff from mimicking the crazy type. (Recall that an increase in y A is compensated by a decrease in y B .) Part (3) states that an increase in country A's relative military strength has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium probability with which country B makes the concessional offer. Intuitively, an increase in y A has two effects. First, for the same reason as before, it makes the concessional offer more appealing for country B. Second, by increasing the expected payoff from attacking, it makes the strategic type of country A more aggressive. Thus, due to the defense motive that we described previously, the strategic type of country B must decrease the probability of concession. Depending on which of these forces prevails, the probability of making the concessional offer could either increase or decrease. Similar reasoning lies behind the intuition of part (4), which states that an increase in the relative military strength of country A has an ambiguous effect on the probability with which country B makes the intermediate offer (5) states that the effect of an increase in the military strength of country A has an ambiguous effect on whether country A accepts or rejects country B's greedy offer. Once more, the reason for this is that the the defense motive for country A serves as a countervailing force vis-a-vis the increase in expected payoff associated with the rejection of the greedy offer.
Therefore, due to the defensive motive, an increase in the military strength of country A may lead country B to be less accommodating and to actually test country A's true type by making the intermediate offer y A . Notice that this result holds when there is little uncertainty that country A is strategically rational-i.e., when a > a . This is exactly the parameter range in which the strategic type of country B is more concerned about defending itself against attacks from the strategic type of country A.
Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Payoffs
In this section, we study the comparative statics of ex ante expected payoffs with respect to the prevalence and aggressiveness of crazy types in our model. Proposition 1 immediately implies that country A's ex ante expected payoff is equal to
where the equilibrium value of β(r A ) in region (iv) is given in Proposition 1. Furthermore, since Proposition 1 says that country B always puts positive probability on offer r A , country B's expected payoff at the node at which it makes an offer is always 1 − r A . This implies that country B's ex ante expected payoff is always given by
where α takes its equilibrium value in Proposition 1 depending on which of the five regions the parameters (a 0 , b 0 ) fall in. Thus country B's expected payoff is always strictly less than z B since z B > 1 − r A , which follows from Assumptions 1(iii) and 2(i).
Prevalence of Crazy Types. It is straightforward to verify that V
A is larger than z A in regions (ii) and (iv). Therefore, recalling that r A > z A > s A , we know that country A's payoff is always weakly decreasing in the prior probability that country B is the crazy type, 1 − b 0 , and strictly decreasing in regions (ii) and (iv). The reason for this is that a higher probability of facing the crazy type reduces country A's incentive to play aggressively. On the other hand, country A's payoff is piecewise constant in 1 − a 0 with upward jumps when a 0 crosses a and a in the region where b 0 > b. Indeed, if its own prior reputation for being crazy exceeds a critical value, country A will be able to ignore the reputation motive and adjust its equilibrium behavior in order to obtain a higher payoff. For similar reasons, V B is always decreasing in the prior probability, 1 − a 0 , with which its opponent is crazy, and strictly decreasing in regions (i), (iii) and (v). Furthermore, it is piecewise constant in 1 − b 0 with discrete upward jumps when b 0 crosses the boundaries of the equilibrium regions. We summarize the above discussion as follows.
Proposition 5.
(1) Country A's ex ante expected payoff V A is:
(i) weakly increasing in b 0 and strictly increasing in regions (ii) and (iv).
(ii) piecewise constant in a 0 with downward jumps at the boundaries of regions (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).
(2) Country B's ex ante expected payoff V B is:
(i) weakly increasing in a 0 and strictly increasing in regions (i), (iii) and (v).
(ii) piecewise constant in b 0 with downward jumps at the region boundaries.
Proof. Follows from the characterization of Proposition 1.
Aggressiveness of Crazy Types. Unlike the comparative statics of payoffs with respect to the prevalence of crazy types, the comparative statics of payoffs with respect to the aggressiveness of crazy types may be ambiguous. The reason behind this ambiguity hinges on the joint effect of the reputation and defense motives. First, consider country A. Changes in r A and 1 − s A affect equilibrium behavior both because these changes may affect behavior within the various regions and because they may affect the boundaries of these regions. As a result V A will sometimes be increasing, sometimes decreasing and sometimes constant in r A and s A . Indeed, as r A increases, the strategic type of country A gains more from mimicking the crazy type. Thus, keeping equilibrium behavior constant, a rise in r A would increase country A's payoff. However, due to the reputation motive for country A, the strategic type of country A will have to lower its probability of attacking in order to preserve its reputation. Furthermore, due to the defense motive of country B, the probability with which the strategic type of country B makes the concessional offer has to decrease. Since these two forces result in a decrease in V A , the ex ante payoff of country A may end up being constant or decreasing in r A . On the other hand, as s A decreases (so that 1 − s A increases), mimicking the crazy type becomes less profitable for the strategic type of country A and more profitable for the strategic type of country B. As a result, the reputation motives of both countries may result in an increase in α and a decrease in β(s A ); when these effects are particularly strong (as is the case in region (iv)), V A may increase in the aggressiveness of country B's crazy type. Now, consider country B. The ex ante payoff of the strategic type of country B varies ambiguously with r A , because a rise in r A has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it decreases the payoff that country B can get by making the concessional offer and, consequently, lowers its expected payoff. On the other hand, because of the reputation motive of country A, it lowers the probability, α, of an attack, which has the effect of increasing country B's payoff. Depending on which effect dominates, V B could either decrease or increase in r A . Finally, a change in the aggressiveness of country B's crazy type, 1 − s A , can also have ambiguous effects on V B through its effect on α. Once more, this is the result of two countervailing forces. On the one hand a decrease in s A directly lowers α, as it decreases the payoff the strategic type of country A can get from mimicking the crazy type. On the other hand, for similar reasons as before, it relaxes the constraints of the reputation motive, and pushes for an increase in α.
The characterization of these comparative statics results follows almost immediately from Proposition 1, but the formal statement of our result, which we present next, requires us to take into account the effects of changes in r A or s A in several regions of the parameter space. To that end, let h = (z A , z B , s A , r A , y A , y 
For some threshold z > 0 (derived in Appendix D), country B's payoffs satisfy
Proof. See Appendix D.
Final Remarks
We now conclude the paper with a brief summary of our contribution, as well as some remarks about the limits of the model and avenues for extensions and future work. We constructed a model of international conflict in which war arises as a result of uncertainty about whether countries behave strategically. This uncertainty may lead even strategic countries to behave according to Machiavelli's dictum that "it is sometimes wise to pretend to be crazy."
Unlike the previous literature, our model delivers unique equilibrium predictions, which enable us to derive a number of new, but natural, comparative static results. In particular, our model identifies two countervailing effects that play a role in determining how often countries pretend to be crazy: the reputation motive, and the defense motive. Whereas the defense motive provides a country with incentives to behave aggressively in order to shield itself from aggression by the opponent, the reputation motive limits the extent to which a country can pretend to be crazy due to reputation concerns. Depending on which of these two forces prevails, conflicts may arise and persist, exacerbating the inefficiencies associated with war.
One of the peculiar features of the model is the treatment of the two countries as being asymmetric in the sense that country A is a first mover and can unilaterally impose peace upon country B. This assumption is built into the game form. Given this rigidity, the most natural way to interpret the model is to assume that country A, the first mover, is a country that is possibly dissatisfied with the status quo, and may seek to change it with force. Country B, on the other hand, is not dissatisfied, but has to entertain the possibility that country A may use force. One simple remedy to this extreme asymmetry is to assume that there are two countries, say P and Q, which are chosen with equal probability to play the game in the role of country A with the other country playing in the role of country B. This is the case of extreme symmetry. More generally, one could assume that P is chosen to play in the role of country A with some probability λ ∈ [0, 1] while Q is chosen to play in the role of country A with complementary probability 1 − λ. In this case, all actions, payoffs and comparative statics (i.e., derivatives of equilibrium actions and payoffs) for each country would be weighted by λ and 1 − λ.
Lastly, by assuming that the crazy type of country A always accepts offers that are at least as large as r A , and by assuming that the bargaining stage of the game is a static interaction, we are ruling out the possibility that crazy types can keep coming back to demand more each time they are appeased. An interesting extension to the model would be to introduce the possibility that crazy types become more demanding whenever their current demands are met. To analyze this extension, we would need to first develop a dynamic model, and then model the crazy type in this way. We think that this would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Nevertheless, we regard the current paper as a first step in the direction of relaxing the strong common-knowledge-of-rationality assumptions that pervade crisis bargaining theory.
(iii) If α = 0 then a 1 = 0. Therefore, country B believes that country A will reject any offer x A < r A . So by making such an offer it expects to receive a payoff of y B . On the other hand, the offer r A would be accepted for sure and give country B a payoff 1 − r A > y B . Therefore, the strategic country B will make offer the offer r A with certainty.
(iv) By the result of (iii), if country B makes the offer y A with positive probability, then it must be that α > 0, consequently a 1 > 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the strategic country A rejects this offer with probability δ > 0. Then the expected payoff to country B from making this offer is
But by making the offer y A + ε, where 0 < ε < δ(1 − y A − y B ), country B would have an expected payoff
since by Lemma 1(i) the offer y A + ε is accepted by the strategic country A. One can then use the assumption that ε < δ(1 − y A − y B ) to verify the the payoff in (A4) is greater than the payoff in (A3).
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium of the game, the support of β is a subset of the following set of three offers: {s A , y A , r A }.
Proof. Recall that equation (19) in the main text states that 1 > r A > y A > s A > 0. So what we must show is that β does not put any probability mass on the intervals [0, s A ), (s A , y A ), (y A , r A ) and (r A , 1]. Next, observe that if a 1 = 0, then α = 0 and by Lemma 1(iii), only r A is in the support of β. Therefore, we can assume throughout the remainder of this proof that a 1 > 0. Suppose β puts positive mass on (r A , 1]. By Lemma 1(i), any offer x A ∈ (r A , 1] will be accepted by both the strategic type and the crazy type; so it will be accepted with certainty. But so will the offer r A . Since 1 − r A > 1 − x A for all x A ∈ (r A , 1], country B has a profitable deviation to the offer r A . Therefore, β must put zero probability mass on (r A , 1].
Suppose that β puts positive mass on (y A , r A ). Then, there exists x A ∈ (y A , r A ) in the support of β. If such an offer x A is made, then by Lemma 1(i) it is accepted with probability a 1 and rejected with probability 1 − a 1 . But again by Lemma 1(i), the offer
will also be accepted with probability a 1 and rejected with probability 1 − a 1 . Moreover, deviating to this offer is profitable for country B. Therefore it cannot be that x A is in the support of β. Consequently, β cannot put positive probability on the interval (y A , r A ). (4) in the main text. Therefore, country B's expected payoff from making the offer x A is equal to y B . But if country B deviates to the offer y A + ε, where 0 < ε < 1 − y A − y B , the strategic country A will accept, giving country B an expected payoff
where the inequality holds by Assumption 1(iii) and ε < 1 − y A − y B . In other words, country B has a profitable deviation to the offer y A + ε. Consequently, β cannot put positive probability mass on [0, s A ) ∪ (s A , y A ).
Lemma 3.
(i) There is no equilibrium with β(r A ) = 0.
(ii) There is no equilibrium with β(y A ) > 0 and β(s A ) = 0. Proof.
(i) Suppose there is an equilibrium with β(r A ) = 0. Then by Lemma 2, β puts positive probability only on a subset of {s A , y A }. But because 0 < s A < y A < z A by Assumptions 1(i) and 2(ii), country A's expected payoff from attacking must be less than z A , its payoff to peace. Thus α = 0, which by Lemma 1(iii) implies β(r A ) = 1. Contradiction.
(ii) Suppose there is an equilibrium with β(y A ) > 0 and β(s A ) = 0. By Lemma 1(iv), we must have α x (y A ) = 0. Since Lemma 3(i) implies β(r A ) > 0 country B's expected payoff from the offer y A must equal its expected payoff from the offer r A :
which reduces to a 1 = a. But note that by (*) we must have α x (s A ) = 0. Consequently, by deviating to the offer s A country B can receive the expected payoff
where the inequality follows from substituting the expression for a, simplifying and using Assumption 2(i) and (ii). Thus the deviation is profitable to country B. Contradiction.
(iii) Suppose a 0 < a. Country B's maximum expected payoff from making the offer y A or s A is a 1 (1 − s A ) + (1 − a 1 )y B . It is easily verified that this expected payoff is strictly less than 1 − r A when a 1 < a. Combining this with Lemma 2 and the fact that a 1 ≡ 
or equivalently a 1 = a. Substituting a 1 from equation (2) in the main text, this reduces to α = 1−a 0 a 0 a 1−a ∈ (0, 1), where the strictly inclusion holds because a 0 > a by assumption. But α ∈ (0, 1) implies the indifference condition Proof. Lemma 3(iv) implies α = 0. Then Lemma 1(iii) implies β(r A ) = 1. Then Lemma 1(ii) implies that α x is given by (*). Moreover, it is easy to verify that the given specifications for α, β and α x are all sequentially rational given the starting beliefs, a 0 and b 0 , and the updated beliefs, a 1 and b x , that they imply.
Lemma 5. If a 0 < a and b 0 > b then the equilibrium set is characterized by α = 1, α x given by (*) above, and β(r A ) = 1.
Proof. Lemma 3(iii) implies that β(r A ) = 1. Then by Lemma 1(ii), α x is given by (*). Finally, it is easy to verify that country A's expected payoff from attack is b 0 r A +(1−b 0 )s A , which is strictly greater than its payoff to peace, z A , whenever b 0 > b. Thus α = 1. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the given specifications for α, β and α x are all sequentially rational given the starting beliefs, a 0 and b 0 , and the updated beliefs, a 1 and b x , that they imply.
Lemma 6. If a 0 > a and b < b 0 < b then the following describes the set of equilibrium behavioral strategy profiles:
, and β(y A ) = 0.
Proof.
Step (1): First we show that β(y A ) = 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that β(y A ) > 0. Lemma 1(iv) implies that α x (y A ) = 0. Lemma 3(ii) implies β(s A ) > 0 as well. Therefore, we need the indifference condition
Since Lemma 3(iv) implies α > 0, which in turn implies a 1 > 0, we solve (A10) for
where the strict inclusion follows from Assumption 2(i) and (ii). This then implies b x (s A ) = s A /y A by Lemma 1(i). Using (4) in the main text, we solve for
Since α > 0 and (A11) implies that country A must have the same expected payoff from accepting and rejecting the offer s A , we need
in which we can substitute (A12) and β(r A ) = 1 − β(y A ) − β(s A ), and solve to get
This expression on the right hand side of (A14) is non-negative if and only if b 0 ≥ b. But this contradicts the premise of the Lemma.
Step (2):
If α x (s A ) = 1 then the expected payoff to country B from making the offer s A would be y B . But by Lemma 1(i), country B's expected payoff to offering r A is 1 − r A > y B by Assumption 2(i). Therefore, we need β(r A ) = 1, which contradicts
is given by (A12). Since we showed in Step (1) that β(y A ) = 0, and we know from Lemma 3(iv) that α > 0, we need
But this inequality reduces to b 0 ≥ b, which is again a contradiction.
Step (3): We now calculate the equilibrium values of α, β and α x . We have shown that α x (s A ) = 0, and β(y A ) = 0, which implies that α x is given by (*) above. Since a 0 > a, Lemma 3(iii) implies β(r A ) < 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3(i), we need β(r A ), β(s A ) > 0. These results imply the indifference condition (A8), which in turn implies a 1 = a. This implies that α = 1−a 0 a 0 a 1−a ∈ (0, 1), where the strict inclusion follows from the fact that a 0 > a by assumption. Next, α ∈ (0, 1) requires the indifference condition in (A9) to be satisfied. The expressions for β(s A ) and β(r A ) follow. Moreover, it is easy to verify that any behavioral strategy profile satisfying the specifications in the statement of Lemma 6 constitutes an equilibrium, given the assumptions on a 0 and b 0 , and the updated beliefs a 1 and b x implied by the behavioral strategy profile. Step ( Step (2): We now show that β(y A ) = 0 in equilibrium. Suppose that β(y A ) > 0. In Step (1) we showed that β(s A ) > 0. Therefore, the indifference condition (A5) must be satisfied; thus a 1 = a and α = 1−a 0 a 0 a 1−a . Since a 0 < a, by assumption, we have α > 1, which is absurd.
Step (3) 
This implies that α x (s A ) takes the value stated in the Lemma. Moreover, it is easy to verify that any behavioral strategy profile satisfying the specifications in the statement of Lemma 6 constitutes an equilibrium, given the assumptions on a 0 and b 0 , and the updated beliefs a 1 and b x implied by the behavioral strategy profile. Step ( 
D. Proof of Proposition 6
Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that a, a, b, b are all decreasing in r A ; a and b are increasing in s A ; and, b and b are respectively decreasing and constant in s A . Furthermore, our assumptions imply r A > s A so that that V A is larger in region (ii) than in region (iv), and larger in region (iv) than in regions (i), (iii) and (v).
Consider first the payoffs of country A. V A is constant in both r A and s A in regions (i), (iii) and (v) and increasing in both of these parameters in regions (ii) and (iv). Therefore, the statement of the proposition follows immediately from these results and the changes in the boundaries of the five regions reported above. 
Finally, consider a change in the aggressiveness of country B as measured by 1 − s A . Notice that V B will increase (respectively, decrease) as α decreases (respectively, increases) after we change from h to h † . The result follows immediately by characterizing the regions in which these changes take place.
